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NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS AS AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF
ACTION IN CALIFORNIA: DO DEFENDANTS
FACE UNLIMITED LIABILITY?
I. INTRODUCTION
As society becomes more complex we are faced with a
multiplication of psychic stimuli. These stimuli and "the
widespread knowledge of the debilitating effect mental dis-
tress may have on an individual's capacity to carry on the
functions of life in this growing society,"1 have caused the
courts to recognize a need to protect mental equilibrium. "A
sound mind within a disabled body can accomplish much,
while a disabled mind in the soundest of bodies is rarely capa-
ble of making any substantial contribution to society."' Re-
sponding to this theory, the California Supreme Court, in
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,' declared that indi-
viduals have a legally protected right to be free from the neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress, thereby establishing a
new basis for recovery of damages." This comment examines
the court's departure from established principles for dealing
with emotional distress. In determining whether a significant
change has occurred, this comment analyzes (1) the determi-
nation of proper plaintiffs, (2) the degree of emotional distress
required to bring a cause of action, and (3) the future impact
of the Molien decision. Furthermore, standards are proposed
to aid in the adjudication of negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims.
0 1982 by Nancy A. Chillag.
1. Rodriques v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970).
2. Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: The Case for an Inde-
pendent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment]; See J. COLE-
MAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 192 (3d ed. 1964).
3. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
4. "[W]e hold that a cause of action may be stated for the negligent infliction of
serious emotional distress." Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS IN
CALIFORNIA
California courts have not traditionally provided com-
plete protection from negligently inflicted emotional distress. 5
The courts were hesitant to protect this interest because of
the likelihood of fraudulent claims and the potentially unlim-
ited liability of the defendant for every type of mental distur-
bance." Mental distress has been protected, however, when the
dangers of fraudulent claims and undue liability were out-
weighed by assurances of genuine and serious mental dis-
tress.7 In drawing exceptions to the rule of no recovery, the
courts found an assurance of genuineness in accompanying
physical injury or impact.
A plaintiff can recover damages for physical injury and
also for any mental distress that may naturally flow from it.'
Because California, however, is a "no-impact" jurisdiction, it
is not necessary for a plaintiff to show that he suffered con-
temporaneous physical impact in order to recover damages for
injuries sustained as a result of emotional distress.9 In other
words, in addition to being entitled to compensation for
mental suffering sustained as a result of physical injury or im-
pact, a plaintiff in California may also state a cause of action
for physical injury resulting from emotional distress.10 For ex-
5. Id. at 926, 161 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
6. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii at 172, 472 P.2d at 519.
7. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (4th ed. 1971), [hereinaf-
ter cited as PROSSER].
8. "[M]ental suffering frequently constitutes the principle element of tort dam-
ages (Rest. 2d Torts, § 905, Com. C); awards which fail to compensate for pain and
suffering have been held inadequate as a matter of law." Capelouto v. Kaiser Founda-
tion Hosps., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 892-93, 500 P.2d 880, 882-83, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858-59
(1972).
9. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963), overruled on other grounds, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d
912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 115 (1967). For a summary of the treatment of emotional distress claims in
light of the physical injury requirement in jurisdictions other than California, see
Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VILL. L. REV.
232 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Brody].
10. Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 111 Cal: 668, 44 P. 320 (1896).
There can be no recovery of damages for emotional distress unaccompa-
nied by physical injury where such emotional distress arises only from
negligent conduct.
However, if a plaintiff has suffered a shock to the nervous system or
other physical harm which was proximately caused by negligent conduct
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ample, a plaintiff may recover damages for severe shock to his
entire nervous system which resulted in high blood pressure."
Regardless of the sequence of events, physical injury has tra-
ditionally been a requirement when dealing with negligently
inflicted emotional distress.
The physical injury requirement, however, has been de-
fined expansively. Damages are recoverable for many nervous
disturbances or disorders that are themselves properly classi-
fied as physical injuries. 12 In addition to physical pain,'8 the
courts have defined gastric disturbance, loss of sleep, nervous
disorder, nervousness, anxiety or grief, shock, worry, dis-
tress, mortification, indignity, humiliation,' 6 and nausea17 as
physical injuries. Until Molien, however, California courts re-
fused to allow a plaintiff to state a cause of action purely for
negligent infliction of emotional distress without physical in-
jury, 18 reasoning that the physical injury provided a guarantee
of a defendant, then such plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from
such a defendant for any resulting physical harm and emotional distress.
California Jury Instruction, BAJI No. 12.80 (6th ed. 1977). The language of this in-
struction appears to be derived mainly from the opinions in Vanoni v. Western Air-
lines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 795-97, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115, 116-17 (1967) and Espinosa v.
Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234, 249 P.2d 843, 845 (1952) which derived
their reasoning from Sloane. See also Fuentes v. Perez, 66 Cal. App. 3d 163, 168, 136
Cal. Rptr. 275, 276-77 (1977); Leasman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 48 Cal. App. 3d 376,
381, 121 Cal. Rptr. 768, 770-71 (1975); Gautier v. Gen. Telephone Co., 234 Cal. App.
2d 302, 307, 44 Cal. Rptr. 404, 407-08 (1965).
11. Lindner v. Barkley, 109 Cal. App. 337, 293 P. 112 (1930).
12. Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918). See Di Mare v. Cresci,
58 Cal. 2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1962); Vanoni v. Western Airlines,
247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967); Lowenthal v. Mortimer, 125 Cal. App.
2d 636, 270 P.2d 942 (1954).
13. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967).
14. Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977);
Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952); Cook v. Maier,
33 Cal. App. 2d 581, 92 P.2d 434 (1939).
15. Taylor v. Pole, 16 Cal. 2d 668, 107 P.2d 614 (1940).
16. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967).
17. Medeiros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 707, 135 P.2d 676
(1943).
18. There is one exception to this rule in California. The courts allow recovery
for emotional distress, regardless of physical injury, which results from negligent em-
balming. Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948); Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal.
App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980); Carey v. Lima, Salmon and Tully Mortuary,
168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (1959). The courts reason that there is a special
likelihood of genuine and serious emotional distress, arising from the special and deli-
cate circumstances of the case, which provides a guarantee that the claim is not spuri-
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of the genuineness of the mental distress claim.
California courts have extended broader protection to
emotional well-being when the defendant was more than
merely negligent. A cause of action may be instituted for
mental suffering alone, without consequent physical injury, in
cases where the defendant's conduct amounts to extreme and
outrageous intentional invasion of mental and emotional tran-
quility.'9 But without proof of outrageous conduct on the part
of the defendant, no cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress will stand absent physical injury.2
The courts also recognize a claim for emotional distress
damages when the plaintiff has another actionable tort claim
against the defendant arising out of the same transaction.2
Breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,22
ous. See Lezin, Mortuary Liable for Mental Distress Damages for Mishandling a
Corpse, L. A. Daily J., Apr. 9, 1980 at 1.
19. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88
(1970); State Rubbish etc. Ass'n. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952);
Renteria v. Orange County, 82 Cal. App. 3d 835, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978); Leavy v.
Cooney, 214 Cal. App. 2d 496, 29 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1963); Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.
App. 2d 472, 28 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1963); Vargas v. Ruggiero, 197 Cal. App. 2d 709, 17
Cal. Rptr. 568 (1961); Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 (1955);
Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal. App. 2d 124, 217 P.2d 113 (1950). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1978); McCubbin, Torts: An Analysis of Mental
Distress as an Element of Damages and as a Basis of an Independent Cause of
Action When Intentionally Inflicted, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 106, 110-121 (1980).
20. "The defendant must have the intention of causing the emotional distress;
his conduct must be outrageous where damages are sought for emotional distress
alone; and it must be unreasonable where recovery is sought for foreseeable physical
injury." 6 CAL. JUR. 3d Assault & Other Willful Torts, Summary § 100-01 (1973). See
Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828
(1979); Altman v. Manhattan Say. Bank, 83 Cal. App. 3d 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. 100
(1978); Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 83 Cal. App. 3d 38, 147 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1978);
Cornblith v. First Maintenance Supply Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 564, 74 Cal. Rptr. 216
(1968); Spackman v. Good, 245 Cal. App. 2d 518, 54 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1966).
21. See 27 Cal. 3d at 927, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837. Contra,
Quezada v. Hart, 67 Cal. App. 3d 754, 136 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977) (independent causes
of action have some element of intentional conduct that justifies the emotional dis-
tress claim under State Rubbish).
22. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr.
470 (1975). The court upheld a $200,000 verdict for emotional suffering by four plain-
tiffs as a result of title company's tortious breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in negligently researching and issuing a title report and later inten-
tionally refusing to clear title and defend the insureds. See also Gruenberg v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973) (an insurance com-
pany tortiously breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by refus-
ing to settle claims with its policy holders); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,
426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967) (an insurance company's failure to settle a claim
within insured's policy limit justified emotional distress claim).
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wrongful dishonor of a check,2' breach of bailor-bailee rela-
tionship,24 and tortious breach of contract" constitute inde-
pendent causes of action to which the emotional distress is
treated as a parasitic claim. When the defendant commits a
legally recognized wrongful act the courts will conclude that
emotional distress is a natural result of the conduct, thus al-
lowing the plaintiff to supplement his independent cause of
action with a claim of emotional distress, regardless of physi-
cal injury.
The presence of outrageous conduct or an independent
cause of action provides a guarantee that the emotional dis-
tress claim is not spurious, in much the same manner as the
physical injury requirement in negligence cases insures the va-
lidity of the emotional distress claim. In Molien, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court established an independent cause of ac-
tion for negligent infliction of emotional distress, thereby
abolishing the physical injury requirement. Many commenta-
tors believe abandonment of physical injury is a broad step
that may lead to an uncontrollable flood of litigation. ' As will
be seen, however, Molien does require proof of genuineness of
the emotional distress claim. While the requisite proof is not
specified, the need for some showing of genuineness may indi-
23. Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 123
Cal. Rptr. 848 (1975) (bank wrongfully dishonored a corporation's check causing emo-
tional distress to the corporate officers from subsequent criminal and administrative
investigation and charges).
24. Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal. App. 3d 844, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1970)
(jeweler negligently breached a bailor-bailee relationship and was held liable for dam-
ages upon failing to return rings of known sentimental value thereby causing emo-
tional suffering).
25. Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328, 353 P.2d 294, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 686 (1960) (tortious breach of contract for failure to supply water to plaintiff
supports damages for plaintiff's emotional suffering in witnessing his wife's mental
illness brought on by the breach).
26. What is daring about the decision is not so much that the court al-
lowed recovery for negligent emotional distress, but its willingness to
designate this conduct as tortious because of the unreasonable risk of
emotional distress. . . . The court is expanding the standard of liabil-
ity. . . . The only conduct that was actionable before was when it was
extreme and outrageous-and intentional.
Granelli, Mental Distress Tort Expanded, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Sept. 8, 1980
(quoting Gary Schwartz, Law Professor, University of California at Los Angeles). See
the editorial comment to Kornblum, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Rec-
ognized as Independent Tort, 29 DEF. L.J. 429 (1980) in which the author expresses
his opinion that the court, after Molien, will sanction recovery of damages for "hurt
feelings."
1982]
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cate that Molien is not a drastic departure from established
principles.
III. CASE ANALYSIS: Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
A. The Facts
Steven Molien, plaintiff, brought an action against Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals and one of its doctors, Thomas Kil-
bridge, M.D., alleging loss of consortium and emotional dis-
tress resulting from defendants' negligence in incorrectly diag-
nosing and treating his wife for syphilis. During a routine
physical examination, plaintiff's wife, Valerie Molien, was di-
agnosed as having a contagious form of syphilis and was given
large doses of penicillin in treatment of the disease. Plaintiff,
who was advised of the diagnosis by his wife as instructed by
the defendant doctor, was given a blood test that proved he
did not have syphilis. As a result of this incident, plaintiff's
wife accused him of infidelity and dissolution proceedings
were instituted. The trial court granted demurrers to both
causes of action when plaintiff failed to amend his complaint
and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed.27 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court reversed the demurrer to the loss of con-
sortium cause of action" and held that a cause of action may
be stated for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.29
B. Abolishing the Physical Injury Requirement
The trial court granted the demurrer to the emotional
27. See former opinion Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., superseded upon
grant of hearing by the supreme court pursuant to Cal. R. Ct. 976(d), found at 157
Cal. Rptr. 107 (1st Dist. 1979).
28. It is unknown why the cause of action for loss of consortium was dismissed
at the trial level since the trial court record is silent on that issue. The defendants in
Molien relied on Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 382, 525 P.2d 669,
115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974), to assert that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for
loss of consortium. Rodriquez requires that the non-plaintiff spouse suffer a "severely
disabling" injury to justify damages to the plaintiff spouse, Id. at 400, 525 P.2d at
680, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 776. In his complaint Molien alleged that his wife suffered
emotional distress resulting in "injury to her body and shock and injury to her ner-
vous system." 27 Cal. 3d at 931 n.2, 616 P.2d at 822 n.2, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 840 n.2.
The supreme court held that "obviously a person may become 'severely disabled'
mentally no less than physically, and the resulting detriment to that individual's
spouse is no less serious than if the disability were an impairment of mobility or other
bodily function." Id. at 931, 616 P.2d at 822, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
29. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980).
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distress cause of action because plaintiff did not allege any
physical manifestation of his emotional distress which re-
sulted from marital discord and subsequent dissolution pro-
ceedings. The supreme court, however, recognized that "[t]he
primary justification for the requirement of physical injury
appears to be that it serves as a screening device to minimize
a presumed risk of feigned injuries and false claims." 0 The
court found that such artificial barriers to recovery are unnec-
essary for two reasons."1 First, the requirement of physical in-
jury is both overinclusive and underinclusive. It is overinclu-
sive in permitting recovery for emotional distress when the
suffering accompanies or results in any physical injury, no
matter how trivial.32 The requirement is underinclusive be-
cause it mechanically precludes the litigation of claims that
may well be valid and could be proved if the plaintiff were
permitted to go to trial.3" Second, the requirement of physical
injury encourages extravagant pleadings and distorted testi-
mony.34 Therefore, the court abolished the long-established
general rule that there can be no recovery for emotional dis-
tress or mental suffering unaccompanied by physical harm
arising from solely negligent acts.
30. Id. at 925, 616 P.2d at 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836. See PROSSER, supra note
7, at § 54; 1 DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 1507 (Supp. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, § 436A, Comment b (1965); Comment, supra note 2, at 1244.
31. 27 Cal. 3d at 926, 616 P.2d at 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836. The court relies on
Prosser's explanation:
[T]he difficulty is not insuperable. Not only fright and shock, but other
kinds of mental injury are marked by definite physical symptoms, which
are capable of clear medical proof. It is entirely possible to allow recov-
ery only upon satisfactory evidence and deny it when there is nothing to
corroborate the claim, or to look for some guarantee of genuineness in
the circumstances of the case. The problem is one of proof, and it will
not be necessary to deny a remedy in all cases because some claims may
be false.
PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 54; see also DOOLEY, supra note 30.
32. 27 Cal. 3d at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. Proponents of the
physical injury requirement claim that removal of this barrier will inundate the court
with more litigation than it can handle. But, as the court in Molien recognized, "the
doors are already wide open" due to the broad definition of physical injury. Id. at
929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
33. Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
34. Id. See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1059 (1936); see Annot. 64 A.L.R. 2d 100, 117 n.18, 128 n.8
(1959), in which the authors assert that through the ingenuity of counsel in framing
the pleadings, physical consequences can be found to support any emotional distress
claim.
19821
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C. Guidelines for Lower Courts
Instead of merely removing the requirement of physical
injury, the court declared a new and independent cause of ac-
tion. In addition, it established guidelines for the lower courts
to aid in their analysis of future claims. First, recovery must
be limited to claims of serious mental distress.8 ' Second, "[iln
cases other than where proof of mental distress is of a medi-
cally significant nature, the general standard of proof required
to support a claim of mental distress is some guarantee of
genuineness in the circumstances of the case." Finally, the de-
termination of genuineness is a question of fact to be deter-
mined by the jury.87
As with any seminal case, it is impossible for the court to
anticipate all situations in which the new cause of action will
apply and thus solve all the problems that may arise. This
comment proposes standards to be used for identifying the
plaintiff and defining serious emotional distress when causes
of action are instituted for the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.
35. 27 Cal. 3d at 928, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837. The court notes
that the requirement of seriousness will avoid the possibility that defendants will be
exposed to potentially unlimited liability for invasions of emotional tranquility. The
court declared: "[Slerious mental distress may be found where a reasonable man, nor-
mally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engen-
dered by the circumstances of the case." Id. While not specifically stating that the
reasonable man standard would be the test, the court's extensive reliance on the Rod-
rigues decision implies that such a standard will be used.
36. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (quoting Rodrigues v.
State, 52 Hawaii 156, 172, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)). The court states that this stan-
dard is not difficult to apply, relying on State Rubbish etc. Ass'n. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.
2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952), which dealt with the same standard when con-
fronted with a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court, how-
ever, fails to recognize that the jury hearing a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress is guided by the fact that they must find extreme and outrageous
conduct on the part of the defendant before they can compensate the plaintiff for
damages. See PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 54.
Furthermore, this standard is to be used by the courts to find the existence of
emotional distress; it does not indicate the level of distress which will be given legal
recognition. See notes 66-119 and accompanying text, infra, for a discussion of alter-
native methods to be used by the courts in determining the severity of emotional
distress which merits compensation.
37. [T~he jurors are best situated to determine whether and to what ex-
tent defendant's conduct caused emotional distress, by referring to their
own experience. . . . The screening of claims on this [guarantee of genu-
ineness] basis at the pleading stage is an usurpation of the jury's
function.
27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (citations omitted).
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IV. IDENTIFYING THE PLAINTIFF
A. The Direct Victim versus the Bystander: Distinguishing
Dillon.
Bystanders are plaintiffs who state a cause of action for
injuries suffered as a result of witnessing injury to a third per-
son. At first glance Molien appears 'to be a bystander case,
since the negligent diagnosis pertained to plaintiff's wife and
not to the plaintiff. Bystander scenarios have traditionally
been analyzed under the holding of Dillon v. Legg. In that
case plaintiff witnessed the defendant drive his automobile so
negligently as to cause the death of her daughter. The plain-
tiff brought an action to recover damages for emotional dis-
tress resulting in shock and injury to her nervous system. The
court abandoned the zone of danger rule, 9 which would have
denied the mother recovery because she did not fear for her
own safety, and allowed the plaintiff to state a cause of action
based on the fact that there was a foreseeable risk of harm to
her. The court listed three factors to be taken into account in
determining foreseeability:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the
accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away
from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct
emotional impact upon plaintiff from a sensory and con-
temporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted
with learning of the accident from others after its occur-
rence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely
related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship
or the presence of only a distant relationship. 0
Dillon applies only to persons claiming emotional distress
from witnessing injury to a third person. If the supreme court
in Molien rigidly applied the Dillon foreseeability factors to
the plaintiff, as the appellate court did,' 1 he would have been
barred from recovery because (1) he was not present when the
38. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
39. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), which implemented the zone of danger test.
40. 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
41. See former opinion Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps. superseded upon
grant of hearing by the supreme court pursuant to Cal. R. Ct. 976(d), found at 158
Cal. Rptr. 107 (1st Dist. 1979). The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal
on the ground that Molien did not state a sufficient cause of action in light of the
factors announced in Dillon to determine foreseeability.
1982]
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diagnosis was announced and (2) the incident could not have
caused a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from a
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the event. The
supreme court, however, distinguished Dillon by finding
Molien to be a "direct victim" of defendants' negligent con-
duct. The court reasoned that "the alleged tortious conduct
was directed to [the plaintiff] as well as to his wife."' 2
In an effort to leave the Dillon factors intact and at the
same time avoid applying them in Molien, the court intro-
duced the term "direct victim." To supply a test for identify-
ing a proper plaintiff the court relied on the underlying prin-
ciple of foreseeability present in Dillon to define "direct
victim" as one to whom the risk of harm is reasonably foresee-
able to the defendant.4'
B. Foreseeability of the Risk
Foreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration in es-
tablishing the element of duty." In negligence cases duty may
be defined as "an obligation, to which the law will give recog-
nition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of con-
duct toward another.' 45 The presence of a duty is determined
42. 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835. The court went on
to state:
It is easily predictable that an erroneous diagnosis of syphilis and its
probable source would produce marital discord and resultant emotional
distress to a married patient's spouse; Dr. Kilbridge's advice to Mrs.
Molien to have her husband examined for the disease confirms that
plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the negligent diagnosis. Because the
disease is normally transmitted only by sexual relations, it is rational to
anticipate that both husband and wife would experience anxiety, suspi-
cion, and hostility when confronted with what they had every reason to
believe was reliable medical evidence of a particularly noxious infidelity.
Id.
43. [T]he significance of Dillon for the present action lies not in its de-
lineation of guidelines fashioned for resolution of the precise issue then
before us; rather, we apply its general principle of foreseeability to the
facts at hand, much as we have done in other cases presenting complex
questions of tort liability.
27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
44. 68 Cal. 2d at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
The essential elements of an actionable tort are existence of a legally
protected primary right in favor of the plaintiff, a corresponding duty on
the part of the defendant, breach of that duty by the defendant, and
injury proximately suffered by the plaintiff.
47 CAL. JUR. Torts 2d, § 4 (1959).
45. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 53.
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by whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protec-
tion against the defendant's conduct."6 If a duty is owed to a
person, then that person may bring a cause of action if the
defendant breaches that duty and injury to the plaintiff
results.
But duty is simply "a shorthand statement of a conclu-
sion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself. . . . [D]uty is not
sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that
the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. 4 7 Such pro-
tection is afforded whenever the risk of harm to the plaintiff is
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. In Molien the court
reasoned that when the doctor instructed Mrs. Molien to tell
her husband of the syphilis diagnosis and have him tested for
the disease, the risk of harm to the plaintiff was reasonably
foreseeable; therefore, the "defendants owed plaintiff a duty
to exercise due care in diagnosing the physical condition of his
wife. '8
But what risk of harm was foreseeable? Is the definition
of "direct victim" dependent upon the type of harm which is
foreseeable? If the foreseeable harm was a second misdiagno-
sis, then this would aid in defining a direct victim as one who
comes in contact with the defendant. Molien's cause of action,
however, was for emotional distress arising from marital dis-
cord, not from the misdiagnosis. In analyzing the harm that
must be foreseeable it is helpful to turn to the issue of causa-
tion, which is a necessary element in a negligence cause of
action. 9
C. Causation
If the defendant breaches a duty of due care that he owes
to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff must prove that the injuries
he suffered were caused by the defendant's breach. It would
appear that if duty is not established the question of causa-
46. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014
(1928); GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, ch. 3 (1930); Morison, A Re-examination of the Duty
of Care, 11 MoD. L. REV. 1 (1948); Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1953).
47. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 53.
48. 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
49. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 41. See Shavell, Analysis of Causation and the
Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUDIES 463 (1980).
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tion is never raised, but the two issues are not so easily sepa-
rable. Both hinge on the concept of foreseeability.50
Duty and causation distinguish bystanders from direct
victims. A direct victim is one who suffers injury that is actu-
ally caused by the defendant. Actual causation is determined
by a "but for" standard: but for lefendant's conduct the
plaintiff would not have suffered injury."' Bystanders, on the
other hand, are persons who suffer injury that is proximately
caused by defendant's conduct. Proximate causation is a limi-
tation on actual causation and determines the extent to which
the law will recognize a defendant's liability for the plaintiff's
injury. 2 There is proximate cause when the plaintiff's injuries,
although not the primary result of the defendant's conduct,
are closely connected to the defendant's conduct.58 They are a
secondary result-an injury that occurred from a connection
to the primary result. In Dillon, the child suffered an injury
which was a primary result of defendant's negligent driving,
the plaintiff suffered injury from witnessing the injury to her
child-a secondary result. Therefore, bystanders suffer injury
in a secondary capacity.
The inherent problem in using an unqualified foreseeabil-
ity test is best illustrated by analysis of Molien's loss of con-
sortium cause of action.
D. Loss of Consortium
In Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp." the California
Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether California
should continue to adhere to the rule that a married person
whose spouse has been injured by the negligence of a third
50. "[Tlhe obligation to refrain from . . . particular conduct is owed only to
those who are foreseeably endangered by that conduct [the duty element] and only
with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasona-
bly dangerous [the causation element]." 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW Or TORTS §
16.15 (1956).
51. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 41 n.8.
52. See C. MORRIs & C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS, chs. 7 & 9 (2d ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as MORRIS] for a discussion of the extent to which the law will
grant recovery for foreseeable consequences of a defendant's negligence.
53. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 41; MORRIS, supra note 52.
54. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974). The use of the
foreseeability test to distinguish bystanders from direct victims is illustrated in this
case. The Molien court relies on Rodriquez in reversing the demurrer to plaintiff's
loss of consortium claim.
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party has no cause of action for loss of consortium. 5 The
court concluded that "one who negligently causes a severe and
disabling injury to an adult may reasonable expect that the
injured person is married and that his or her spouse will be
adversely affected by that injury."5 6 The court continued by
analogizing the situation to the Dillon facts finding that it is
as likely that someone will witness an injury to their spouse as
that a mother will witness an injury to her child. 7 Due to this
equally substantial probability that the spouse of a severely
disabled person will suffer a personal loss by reason of that
injury, the spouses' injuries were found to be proximately
caused by defendant's conduct and thus recovery was allowed.
The fact that plaintiff's injuries were a secondary result
of defendant's conduct made the plaintiff a bystander per se.
Since the court relied on Rodriquez in deciding Molien, it ap-
parently found Molien to be a bystander, or an indirect vic-
tim, in the loss of consortium action. In finding Molien to be a
direct emotional distress victim, an inherent conflict arose
with the finding that he was an indirect victim of his wife's
injuries which allowed him to seek relief for loss of consor-
tium. Both the emotional distress and the loss of consortium
arose out of the same transaction. The wife was the primary
victim of the negligent diagnosis; the plaintiff was a bystander
since his injuries arose out of the marital discord which was a
secondary result of the defendant's negligence.
E. Summation
By finding Molien to be a "direct victim" under circum-
stances which indicate "indirect victim" status, the court up-
sets previously defined categories of plaintiffs. Future claims
which involve a chain of events leading ultimately to emo-
55. See Agis-v. Howard Johnson, 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); Sloven-
sky v. Birmingham News Co., 358 So.2d 474 (Ala. App. 1978); Belli, Loss of Consor-
tium: Academic Addendum or Substantial Right?, 16 TRIAL 20 (Feb., 1980); Note,
Right to Recover for Loss of Consortium, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (1975).
56. 12 Cal. 3d at 400, 525 P.2d at 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 776. Rodriquez requires
severe injury to the non-plaintiff spouse in order for the plaintiff spouse to state a
cause of action for loss of consortium. The Molien court found that "a person may
become 'severely disabled' mentally no less than physically, and the resulting detri-
ment to that individual's spouse is no less serious than if the disability were an im-
pairment of mobility or other bodily function." 27 Cal. 3d at 931, 616 P.2d at 822, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 840.
57. 12 Cal. 3d at 400, 525 P.2d at 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
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tional distress will undoubtedly contain extensive litigation
concerning the characterization of the plaintiff. Those found
to be bystanders will still be governed by the Dillon foresee-
ability factors; those found to be direct victims will have their
claims scrutinized under the broad test of foreseeability of the
risk, thus, subjecting the defendant to less limited liability. 8
Unqualified use of foreseeability of the risk is a difficult
standard to apply and even harder to limit,59 especially in
emotional distress cases. A situation that illustrates this point
would be the institution of a cause of action by a child of
Molien for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 0 Under
the court's analysis, the Dillon factors would not apply since
the child did not witness a sudden and brief event which
caused the dissolution of his parents' marriage. The jury
would, therefore, be asked to determine whether the child's
emotional distress was a foreseeable risk of harm. Dillon holds
it foreseeable that a child who is injured will have a parent
who is affected by that injury. Rodriquez holds it foreseeable
that an adult who is injured will have a spouse who is affected
by that injury. Is it equally foreseeable that an adult who is
injured will have a child who is affected by that injury? Will
the harm be foreseeable only if the adult is married? Is of
child bearing age? Will illegitimate children be able to recover
damages? Without further guidance, a jury could find a child,
like his father, to be a foreseeable victim of emotional distress.
Future cases may compel the court to establish factors to
determine the foreseeability of emotional distress in response
to the public policy against unlimited liability." Lower courts
may continue to use the Dillon factors in cases like Molien,
which do not fit the Dillon fact pattern, because they have no
other guide to determine where foreseeability should termi-
nate. On the other hand, lower courts may interpret Molien
58. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 53.
59. Trobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d
554, 558 (1969).
60. Note that a child is barred from stating a loss of parental consortium cause
of action where the injury to the parent was due to negligent conduct on the part of
the defendant. See Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 315 (1977); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977). A child, however, may state a cause of action for intentional
interference with parental consortium. Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221 Cal. App. 2d 431, 34
Cal. Rptr. 479 (1963).
61. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 53.
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more liberally than the supreme court intended and allow infi-
nite recovery since almost anything is foreseeable in
hindsight.2
It may have been the intention of the court to adopt the
traditional definition of direct victim. Recognizing a cause of
action instituted only by those persons who suffer injury as a
primary result of defendant's negligence would necessitate re-jection of the Molien facts, which recognize a cause of action
for injuries to an indirect victim. If the term "direct victim" is
rigidly adopted, then the holding in Molien is extremely nar-
row, eliminating the physical injury requirement for only a
limited number of persons, but reducing the potential for un-
limited liability which is inherent in bystander cases. If this
narrow holding is the intention of the court, a question is
raised regarding the status of a bystander's cause of action.
Will bystanders still be required to prove physical injury to
recover damages for emotional distress? The answer lies in
analyzing the impact Molien will have on Dillon.
Both Dillon and Molien require a certain degree of injury
to justify compensation: Dillon calling for severe fright or
shock"3 and Molien calling for serious emotional distress."
The major difference in the injury requirement is that under
Dillon a bystander must prove that the fright or shock (emo-
tional response) was sufficiently severe to cause physical in-
jury. Under Molien the plaintiff must only prove serious
emotional distress-not emotional distress serious enough to
cause physical injury. It appears that the requirement of
physical injury under Dillon may place a heavier burden of
proof on a bystander than on a direct victim. Analysis of the
definition of serious emotional distress in the context of
Molien, however, does not necessarily lead to this conclusion.
V. SERIOUS EMOTIONAL DisTmss
A. The Reasonable Man Standard
Under Molien only serious emotional distress is compen-
sable.6 Unfortunately, the court does not define the term "se-
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965).
63. 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
64. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
65. 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
66. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
19821
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
rious." Rather, it makes reference to the Hawaii Supreme
Court's standard that serious emotional distress is to be found
where "a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be una-
ble to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by
the circumstances of the case.""" There are two problems with
this definition: first, the reasonable man is being used as a
standard outside the context of its original purpose; second,
pre-existing susceptibility of the plaintiff is not taken into
consideration.
The reasonable man represents a model human being
"with only those human shortcomings and weaknesses which
the community will tolerate on the occasion. . . ...s He is a
fictitious person created by the courts to establish a uniform
standard of behavior. 9 The standard is traditionally used to
determine whether a particular defendant is negligent. Negli-
gence arises if the defendant's conduct did not conform to the
actions of a reasonable person under like circumstances. Ap-
plication of the reasonable man standard to determine the
compensability of the injury sustained by the plaintiff is in-
appropriate. The "reasonable man" was not created for com-
parison with the plaintiff, but rather for comparison with the
defendant.
The inappropriateness of the reasonable man standard is
evidenced by the fact that there exists a tremendous variabil-
ity in the capacity of individuals to withstand the trauma gen-
erated in a particular situation. 0 The ability to cope depends
upon such factors as the education, family relations and eco-
nomic background of each individual.1 Emotional injury is al-
ways a product of predisposition and psychic stimuli, 2 "the
67. Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38 (quoting Rodrigues
v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)). The court states that an
emotional distress claim may be supported by "some guarantee of genuineness in the
circumstances of the case." See note 36, supra, and accompanying text. Once emo-
tional distress is found, it will be necessary for a standard to be applied to determine
whether the emotional distress is "serious" enough to warrant legal recognition. The
failure of the court to supply a definition of "serious" may cause lower courts to rely
on the reasonable man standard since the court referred to it in the Molien opinion.
See note 35, supra, and accompanying text.
68. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 32.
69. Id.
70. See generally S. Schreiber, Damages in Personal Injury and Wrongful
Death Cases, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, 313 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Schreiber].
71. Id.
72. S. FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS 243, 316 (1920).
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amount of stress required to precipitate the injury being in-
versely proportional to the predisposition for it."'7 8 Since every
person has some predisposition to stress it will be difficult to
give meaning to the reasonable man standard. If the reasona-
ble man is to be a person with pre-existing susceptibility, the
level of susceptibility will be difficult to determine since there
does not appear to be an average level. Susceptibility is totally
unique to each individual.
By ignoring the predisposition of a plaintiff, the reasona-
ble man standard conflicts with the general rule that "the de-
fendant who is negligent must take his victim as he finds
him."'7' A defendant is liable to the full extent of plaintiff's
damage when "his negligence, operating on a latent disease or
susceptibility, produces physical injuries far more serious than
anticipated. 7 5 The rule is subverted when the plaintiff is re-
quired to maintain a certain level of susceptibility.7 6
Use of the normally constituted reasonable man standard
may also open the door to a new defense to negligent infliction
of emotional distress-proof of a pre-existing susceptibility of
the plaintiff.7" Since the ability to cope is dependent upon the
background of each individual, it would be difficult to deter-
mine how the normally constituted reasonable man would re-
act, and thus cope, under the circumstances. If the reasonable
man has no pre-existing susceptibilities, proof of plaintiff's
predisposition may limit or bar a defendant's liability.
73. Schreiber, supra note 70, at 313. See also BRILL & BEEBE, A FOLLOW-UP
STUDY OF WAR NEUROSES (1955).
74. Schreiber, supra note 70, at 313.
75. Id. at 310. The rationale is that as between the innocent victim with a sub-
stantial injury and the wrongdoer who failed to take reasonable precautions against
foreseeable damage, the loss should fall on the latter. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 43.
76. The majority view is that absent knowledge of a plaintiff's pre-existing sus-
ceptibility, there should be no recovery where a normal individual would not be af-
fected under the circumstances. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 54. See Vargas v. Rug-
giero, 197 Cal. App. 2d 709, 17 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1961); Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.
App. 2d 124, 217 P.2d 113 (1950); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment f
(1965).
77. Many courts have expressed concern regarding liability to plaintiffs with a
pre-existing susceptibility due to the unreasonable burden placed upon defendants.
See Cosgrove v. Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1965); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H.
174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
Some courts use the proximate causation test to limit the defendant's liability for
emotional distress which results from a pre-existing susceptibility. Other courts freely
apply the rule that the tortfeasor is liable for all resulting damages. Brody, supra
note 9, at 256.
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Under Molien, determination of the severity and genuine-
ness -of emotional distress at the demurrer stage is an "usur-
pation of the jury's function." 8 Therefore, the court will need
a standard to present to the jury at the instruction stage to
aid them in applying the law to the facts of the case. The
court's reference to the reasonable man standard was proba-
bly not intended to place such a stringent limitation on recov-
ery. Lower courts, however, may adopt it as an alternative to
the requirement of physical injury to determine the level of
emotional distress that should be given legal recognition.
B. Alternative Methods for Determining Severity
Because of the inherent problems with use of the reasona-
ble man standard as a substitute for physical injury, three al-
ternative methods for determining legally recognized emo-
tional distress will be presented: (1) the primary-secondary
response distinction; (2) the substantial quantity and endur-
ing quality standard; and (3) the medical proof requirement.
Each alternative method, while possessing problems unique to
itself, is more appropriate than the reasonable man standard
for determining serious emotional distress.
1. The Primary-Secondary Response Distinction
From a medical viewpoint, there are two types of emo-
tional distress, primary and secondary, " that can result from
a traumatic stimulus.80 A primary reaction to stimulus is auto-
matic and instinctive, and "constitutes the individual's at-
78. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
79. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1248-53, for an excellent medical analysis of
mental distress. This law review article was cited by the Molien court in reaching its
decision that recovery should be allowed for serious emotional distress. The court,
however, did not adopt the medical analysis of emotional distress the author
presented, nor the conclusion that medical proof should be required to state a claim.
This article was also cited by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Leong v. Takasaki, 55
Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974), which did adopt the analysis and conclusion
presented. See text accompanying notes 113-119, infra. The California Supreme
Court relies not only on the article, but on the Hawaii Supreme Court decisions to
shape its decision in Molien. Therefore, presentation of this medical framework is
imperative to an analysis of serious emotional distress under Molien.
80. See Brickner, The Psychology of Disability, TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SUR-
GERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 65 (P. Cantor ed. Supp. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Brickner];
Laughlin, Neuroses Following Trauma, 6 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE
ATTORNEY 76, 77 (P. Cantor ed. 1962). Traumatic stimulus may be defined as an im-
pact, force, or event which acts upon an individual for a brief or extended period of
time. Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis and Law, 6 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REV. 428, 430 (1957).
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tempt to combat the stress engendered by the defendant's
* . .act, and is exemplified by such emotional responses as
fear, anger, grief, shock, humiliation, or embarrassment.""1
This reaction is usually of short duration and totally subjec-
tive in nature, the degree of severity varying according to the
individual and the circumstances surrounding the stress.82
Primary reactions are simply the mechanism inherent in an
individual to adjust normally to a traumatic event.83
Secondary reactions, which may be termed traumatic
neuroses,84 are continuations of the primary reactions and
"are caused by an individual's continued inability to ade-
quately adjust to a traumatic event. 85 This type of reaction is
far more serious in nature than the primary reaction, pro-
duces symptoms that are real and identifiable, and can be se-
riously disabling.8 8
Medical science has identified three forms of secondary
responses that occur frequently. The first is the anxiety re-
sponse in which the trauma produces severe tension which re-
sults in nervousness, nausea, weight loss, stomach pains,
genito-urinary distress, fatigue, weakness, headaches, back-
aches, irritability, or indecision as long as the tension lasts.87
The second, the conversion reaction, is a reaction to trauma in
which the individual converts consciously disowned impulses
into paralysis, loss of hearing or sight, pain, and muscular
spasm or other physiological symptoms which cannot be ex-
plained by actual physical impairment.8 8 The third, the hypo-
chondriasis response, is characterized by an over-concern with
health, a fear of illness, and other unpleasant sensations
which are commonly known as phobias.8"
The Hawaii Supreme Court, which recognizes a cause of
81. Comment, supra note 2, at 1249.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1249 n.67. "By definition, the primary reaction involves no lasting
debilitating effects. The frequency and possible severity and unpleasantness of these
emotional states are part and parcel of common human experience and do not lie
within the exclusive expertise of medical science." Id. at 1252 n.84.
84. See J. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 192 (3d ed.
1964); Brickner, supra note 80, at 86-88.
85. Comment, supra note 2, at 1250.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Schwartz, Neuroses Following Trauma, TRAUMA 64 (Dec. 1959) [hereinafter
cited as Schwartz].
89. Comment, supra note 2, at 1251.
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action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, 90 al-
lows recovery for both primary and secondary responses to
psychic stimuli.9 1 But the court realizes the problem inherent
in allowing this broad recovery.92 When primary reactions oc-
cur, the physician or psychiatrist must rely on the plaintiff's
testimony, the circumstances surrounding the trauma, "the
psychiatrist's knowledge of pain and disability likely to result
from the trauma, and even the framework of human experi-
ence and common sense" 93 to determine whether the response
surpasses the level of stress with which a person may be ex-
pected to cope.
The calculation of damages is easier when the victim suf-
fers secondary responses because objective standards may be
applied to assess the damages.94 Proof of secondary reactions
focuses on the suffering and disability actually incurred by
the plaintiff, whereas proof of primary reactions focuses on
the pain and disability the plaintiff possibly could have in-
curred. The possibility of occurrence and the hypothetical
proof associated with primary reactions increase the possibil-
ity of fraudulent claims.
Since secondary reactions are far more detrimental than
primary reactions, it is that type of emotional distress which
90. Rodriques v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). Hawaii was the first
state to grant such expansive protection for mental equilibrium. New York, inl Fer-
rarra v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958), found free-
dom from mental disturbance to be a protected interest, id. at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252,
176 N.Y.S.2d at 999, but subsequently limited the holding simply to an abolishment
of the impact rule. See note 126 supra.
91. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii at 413, 520 P.2d at 767 (1974). Leong severely
limits the protection provided in Rodriques; it not only adopts the Dillon foreseeabil-
ity factors, but also requires medical proof of emotional distress. Id. at 413, 520 P.2d
at 767.
92. [Secondary responses] are more susceptible to medical proof than
primary reactions because they are of longer duration and usually are
manifested by physical symptoms which may be objectively determined.
A psychiatrist can give a fairly accurate estimate of the probable
effects [defendant's] act will have upon the plaintiff and whether the
trauma induced was a precipitating cause of neurosis. . . . In a situation
where only the primary response to trauma occurs, the defendant's neg-
ligence may produce transient but very painful mental suffering and
anguish. Because this reaction is subjective in nature and may not result
in any apparent physical injury, precise levels of suffering and disability
cannot be objectively determined.




should be given recognition by the courts.9 5 There are several
policy reasons for denying recovery for primary reactions to
traumatic stimuli." Individual exposure to some psychic stim-
uli is a necessary element in building resistance to them and
enabling an individual to adequately cope in our complex soci-
ety. 7 There is also a need for the efficient administration of
justice." Furthermore, freedom from emotional distress must
be balanced against society's interest in freedom of action and
community progress." Any law which unduly protects mental
equilibrium will "stifle initiative and thus inhibit cultural
advancement."'°0
While this approach limits recovery to identifiable forms
of emotional distress, problems may arise in drawing a line
between primary and secondary reactions. The most signifi-
cant problem is the inability of psychiatrists and medical ex-
perts to agree on the classification of a particular response.
Many commentators believe this conflict will result in injus-
tice and the role of the jury will be subordinated to that of the
psychiatrist.10' That problem, however, is not unique to emo-
tional distress cases ' and should not be the sole reason for
abandoning the proposed definition.
95. It is interesting to note that all secondary reactions, as well as most primary
reactions, have corresponding physical ramifications, differing only in the degree of
disability to the inflicted person. Comment, supra note 2, at 1260. "It is now clearly
recognized by medical experts that mental injury and physical injury are not separate
and distinct types of harm. All emotional disturbances necessarily possess some phys-
ical aspect." Id. See also Brickner, supra note 80, at 65.
96. See Schreiber, supra note 70, at 310.
97. Id. See also Smith, Relations of Emotions to Injury and Disease, 30 VA. L.
REV. 193, 255 n.194 (1944).
98. "In order to protect the courts from being flooded with insignificant griev-
ances, the law has always refused to concern itself with trifles. Into this category must
be placed the minor disturbances which are part of the wear and tear of everyday
life." Schreiber, supra note 70, at 310.
99. Id.
100. Id. Other factors include convenience of administration, capacity of the
parties to bear the loss, a policy of preventing future injuries, the moral blame at-
tached to the wrongdoer, and many others. See Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH.
L. REv. 1, 12-15 (1953).
101. Schwartz, supra note 88, at 52; Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as
an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1335
(1965).
102. Smith, Ideal Use of Expert Testimony in Psychology, 6 WASHBURN L.J.
300, 301 (1967).
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2. The Substantial Quantity and Enduring Quality
Standard
The second alternative to the reasonable man standard
arises from the long-established cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Independent protection for
mental equilibrium was initially recognized in California in
the 1952 case, State Rubbish, etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff.1° In that
case, plaintiffs brought an action for payment on promissory
notes. The defendant cross-complained for the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress resulting from harassment and
threats of bodily injury if defendant did not join plaintiff's as-
sociation and pay for a collection account taken from an asso-
ciation member. The Supreme Court of California affirmed
the damage award to the defendant, stating:
The interest in freedom from severe emotional distress is
regarded as of sufficient importance to require others to
refrain from conduct intended to invade it. Such conduct
is tortious. The injury suffered by the one whose interest
is invaded is frequently far more serious to him than cer-
tain tortious invasions of the interest in bodily integrity
and other legally protected interests. In the absence of a
privilege, the actor's conduct has no social utility; indeed
it is anti-social. No reason or policy requires such an actor
to be protected from the liability which usually attaches
to the willful wrongdoer whose efforts are successful. 104
The court not only protected mental equilibrium from in-
tentional invasion, but also abolished the requirement of
physical injury.105 Unfortunately, the court provided no spe-
cific definition of serious emotional distress, but rather per-
mitted the jury to find serious emotional distress solely by re-
ferring to the defendant's conduct. In other words, mere proof
that the defendant's conduct was outrageous and extreme was
sufficient indication of the genuineness of the emotional dis-
tress.10 a This rationale is similar to the one presented in
103. 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
104. Id. at 337, 240 P.2d at 285 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46,
Comment d (Supp. 1948)).
105. "In cases where mental suffering constitutes a major element of damages it
is anomalous to deny recovery because the defendant's intentional misconduct fell
short of producing some physical injury." 38 Cal. 2d at 338, 240 P.2d at 286.
106. It may be contended that to allow recovery in the absence of physi-
cal injury will open the door to unfounded claims and a flood of litiga-
tion, and that the requirement that there be physical injury is necessary
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Molien, since the court in Molien allows the plaintiff to prove
genuineness of the severity of emotional distress through the
circumstances of the case. 10 7
This standard could find a defendant, whose conduct is
intentional, liable to a plaintiff who suffered no actual dam-
ages, or at least no serious emotional distress. The jury could
not only require the compensation of the plaintiff for damages
actually sustained, but could also punish the defendant for his
extreme and outrageous conduct.10 8 Therefore, a test for se-
verity based solely on the defendant's conduct may find a
plaintiff compensated for injuries he never sustained.
This discrepancy was recognized eighteen years later by a
California appellate court in Fletcher v. Western National
Life Ins. Co.'09 In that case the court realized that in order for
emotional distress to be compensable, it must be shown to ac-
tually exist and be of the requisite severity.'10 In an effort to
estabish a standard for determining severe emotional distress
the court stated:
'Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in
this world, and some degree of transient and trivial emo-
tional distress is a part of the price of living among peo-
ple. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is
so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to
endure it. The intensity and duration of the distress are
to insure that serious mental suffering actually occurred. The jury is or-
dinarily in a better position, however, to determine whether outrageous
conduct results in mental distress than whether that distress in turn re-
sults in physical injury. From their own experience jurors are aware of
the extent and character of the disagreeable emotions that may result
from the defendant's conduct, but a difficult medical question is
presented when it must be determined if emotional distress resulted in
physical injury. . . . Greater proof that mental suffering occurred is
found in the defendant's conduct designed to bring it about than in
physical injury that may not have resulted therefrom.
Id. at 338, 240 P.2d at 286. See Theis, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: A
Need for Limits on Liability, 27 DE PAUL L. REv. 275 (1978).
107. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
108. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 12. Basing a monetary award on the degree of
a defendant's culpability is partly due to the fact that "the jury is asked to evaluate
in terms of money a detriment for which monetary compensation cannot be ascer-
tained with any demonstrable accuracy." Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 172, 417
P.2d 673, 675, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 131 (1966).
109. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
110. Id. at 396-97, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 90 (relying on PRossER, supra note 7, at § 12
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965)).
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factors to be considered in determining its severity.'" It
appears, therefore, that in this context, 'severe' means
substantial or enduring as distinguished from trivial or
transitory. Severe emotional distress means, then, emo-
tional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring
quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society
should be expected to endure it."'
While the court used the inappropriate reasonable man
standard, the definition of serious emotional distress could be
modified by excluding this standard, and still provide ade-
quate guidance. Serious emotional distress should be defined
as emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring
quality that the plaintiff is unable to adequately cope in a civ-
ilized society. This definition is consistent with the general
rule that the negligent defendant must take his victim as he
finds him, and at the same time provides a description of the
type of injury the law will redress.
Relating this definition to the previous discussion of pri-
mary and secondary responses, recovery would be limited to
secondary responses since all primary responses are only tem-
porary in nature, regardless of the degree of mental anguish
encountered. While the same result would be reached under
either the primary-secondary standard or the substantial
quantity and enduring quality standard, the latter avoids the
discrepancies inherent in medical expert testimony concerning
classification of emotional distress. The psychiatrist would not
be required to categorize the plaintiff's injury, but only to de-
scribe it.
Without the qualification of substantial quantity and en-
during quality, the negligent defendant may be liable for tran-
sient and trivial emotional upsets. Not only is this liability
contrary to public policy, but it would impose greater liability
on a defendant who is merely negligent than on a defendant
whose conduct is intentional and culpable.
3. The Medical Proof Requirement
The third alternative to replace the reasonable man stan-
dard is the medical proof requirement. As discussed previ-
111. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 397, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 90 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
oF TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965)).
112. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 397, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 90. See also Murphy v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 83 Cal. App. 3d 38, 147 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1978).
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ously, the Hawaii Supreme Court, in 1970, provided indepen-
dent protection for mental equilibrium. Four years later the
court, in Leong v. Takasaki,"3 recognized the inherent
problems of a broad definition of serious emotional distress",
and thus attempted to limit the defendant's potential liabil-
ity. Using the primary-secondary response analysis, the court
limited recovery to emotional distress that is medically prova-
ble. The court stated that:
the absence of a secondary response and its resulting
physical injury should not foreclose relief .... [P]laintiff
should be permitted to prove medically the damages oc-
casioned by his mental responses to defendant's negligent
act, and the trial court should instruct the jury
accordingly. " 5
Leong eliminates a defendant's liability for claims of
emotional distress that lead to no recognizable disability or
injury. While it does not automatically deny relief for primary
reactions, the case limits recovery to secondary reactions and
primary reactions that produce pain and anguish and which
are seriously disturbing to the plaintiff," 6 provided the reac-
tion is medically provable.""
The requirement of medical proof appears narrower than
the Molien language that "in cases other than where proof is
of a medically significant nature, the general standard of
proof required to support a claim of mental distress is some
guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case.""'
Molien, therefore, allows recovery absent medical proof. Med-
ical proof, however, is required in all other personal injury
actions."19
113. 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
114. Id. at 413, 520 P.2d at 767. See text accompanying note 92, supra.
115. Id. at 413, 520 P.2d at 767 (emphasis added).
116. Comment, supra note 2, at 1252.
117. Mental distress should be defined as:
any traumatically induced reaction which is medically detrimental to
the individual. . . . Under this approach, the plaintiff's threshold bur-
den of proving legal damage would be satisfied upon demonstration of
any medically provable mental distress or harm. The trier of fact would
then apply the severity standard in order to determine if the harm is
legally sufficient to warrant compensation.
Id. at 1255.
118. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (quoting Rodrigues
v. State, 52 Hawaii at 172, 472 P.2d at 520) (emphasis added).
119. "In personal injury cases, an initial medical determination must be made
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The medical proof standard not only applies to the initial
determination of a sufficient cause of action, but also defines
the legally recognized level of distress. The standard would
deny recovery for slight, temporary disturbances to a plain-
tiff's mental equilibrium, but allow recovery for emotional dis-
tress of a debilitating nature.
C. Summation
The California Supreme Court's inference in Molien, that
serious emotional distress is compensable if a reasonable man,
normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope
with the stress engendered under the circumstances of the
case, is incapable of just application. Three alternative stan-
dards have been proposed. Emotional distress may be found
where (1) the plaintiff suffers secondary reactions to the
psychic stimuli produced under the circumstances of the case,
(2) the emotional distress is of such substantial quantity or
enduring quality that the plaintiff is unable to adequately
cope in a civilized society, or (3) the plaintiff is capable of
proving medically the damages occasioned by his mental re-
sponse to defendant's negligent act. Adoption of any one of
these standards will provide adequate guidance to lower
courts.
Regardless of which definition the court applies, it is ap-
parent that physical manifestation of the emotional distress
will be an important element in a plaintiff's case under
Molien. It is necessary to compare these physical manifesta-
tions with the "substantial injury" requirement of Dillon to
determine whether Molien will be applicable to bystanders.
VI. THE IMPACT ON Dillon
The plaintiff in Dillon alleged that she suffered shock and
injury to her nervous system,1 0 which the court determined to
be sufficient to classify as a substantial injury. Nervous shock,
however, can be classified as a primary reaction because it
produces only a relatively transient upset. 2 ' Other primary
establishing actual medical harm to the plaintiff. A legal determination must then be
reached as to whether plaintiff's injury is sufficiently serious to merit compensation."
Comment, supra note 2, at 1255 n.102.
120. 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
121. Smith & Soloman, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. REV. 87, 123
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reactions have also satisfied the substantial injury require-
ment.'22 Two conclusions may be drawn from this fact: (1) if
Dillon allows recovery for primary reactions, this may account
for the Molien court's unwillingness to adopt the secondary
response limitation, thus indicating that serious mental dis-
tress is compensable when secondary or primary reactions are
present; or (2) if Molien is limited to secondary reactions or
emotional distress of a substantial quantity or enduring quali-
ty, then Dillon may require a lesser burden of proof by a
plaintiff who is a bystander. This second conclusion is without
merit. It erroneously indicates that the court is less willing to
protect the interests of those persons who come in direct con-
tact with the defendant (direct victims) than those who suffer
injury in a secondary capacity (bystanders).
For this reason it must be assumed that the court is pres-
ently willing to allow recovery for more than strictly secon-
dary reactions. Therefore, Molien and Dillon may require the
same level of emotional distress to justify compensation. In
light of this assumption, it is likely that the court would be
willing to abolish the physical injury requirement in Dillon for
the same reasons it rejected the physical injury requirement
in Molien.123 This rationale appears to make it easier for a
bystander to state a cause of action in the future. 124
VII. CONCLUSION
In Molien the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its
favorable attitude toward plaintiffs in personal injury cases.
Independent protection of mental equilibrium was a logical
progression from the past efforts to grant compensation for
emotional injury. Future decisions by the court will hopefully
refine the rough edges of the Molien decision by providing ad-
(1944). "The initial reaction is usually charcterized as nervous shock. Nervous shock
from psychic stimuli generally produces only relatively transient upset or disability
through excessive physiological responses." Id. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1249
n.67.
122. See text accompanying notes 13-17, supra, for examples of primary
reactions.
123. See text accompanying notes 32-34, supra, for a discussion of the Molien
court's reasons for abolishing the physical injury requirement.
124. The Dillon foreseeability factors probably will not be abolished since they
pertain to the relationship of the plaintiff to the direct victim and the location of the
plaintiff to the scene of the accident. They do not necessarily pertain to the degree of
emotional distress required to state a cause of action.
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equate guidance to the lower courts in applying the standards
deliniated.
The present status of an action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress raises many questions. What type of person
may institute a cause of action-direct victims or bystanders?
What standard should be used for determining the severity of
emotional distress? What is the impact on Dillon? Unfortu-
nately no guidance is provided by sister states which recognize
negligently inflicted emotional distress as an independent
cause of action. The 1957 New York decision, Ferrarra v. Gal-
luchio,125 which granted independent protection to mental
equilibrium, has been interpreted as merely abolishing the im-
pact rule, not as removing the physical injury requirement.'2
The 1970 Hawaii decision, Rodrigues v. State,12 7 on which the
California Supreme Court heavily relied for its decision in
Molien,128 has been significantly limited by the subsequent
Leong decision. 12  Due to the lack of guidance, the California
125. 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
126. In Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961), the court struck down the impact rule in New York, failing to cite Ferrarra as
a controlling case decided just three years earlier. Nine years later in Trobin v. Gross-
man, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1969), the court narrowly
interpreted Ferrarra and Battalla as abolishing the physical impact rule, not as re-
moving the physical injury requirement. The Trobin court rejected the Dillon theory,
refusing to allow recovery of emotional distress damages to a witness related to an
accident victim. This view was reaffirmed in Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334
N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975).
127. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
128. The Rodrigues court adopted a policy of recognizing emotional ties to ma-
terial objects. In Rodrigues, plaintiffs brought an action for damage caused to their
home by surface waters overflowing a blocked drainage culvert. The court affirmed
the award of damages to compensate for the negligent failure of the state highway
department (defendant) to clear the culvert when it became blocked. The plaintiffs
also brought an independent cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress which resulted from viewing their damaged home. While the majority affirmed
the damage award for the emotional distress, one dissenting judge stated:
This attachment [to property] should neither be encouraged by society
nor made a basis for recovery in a court of law in an age when man has
surrounded himself with a veritable plethora of material possessions ap-
proaching the limits of what even an affluent society needs or can afford.
Id. at 179, 472 P.2d at 523 (Levinson, J., dissenting).
The California Supreme Court may be faced with claims arising from negligent
damage to property. By adopting the standards established in Rodrigues, the court
will have a difficult time denying recovery. Furthermore, recognition of emotional ties
to material objects would preempt any attempt to establish limits on recovery for
damages suffered as a result of emotional ties to a human being who is negligently
injured.
129. See note 91, supra, and accompanying text. Leong, in addition to requiring
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Supreme Court allows the jury, in its capacity as trier of fact,
to answer the aforementioned questions. If the jury finds a
close connection between the defendant's conduct and the vic-
tim's injury, then the victim is deemed to have standing as a
plaintiff. Since the court does not require medical proof of
emotional injury, the jury is allowed to examine the circum-
stances of the case to determine whether the emotional dis-
tress is sufficiently genuine to warrant compensation.
Because many of these questions cannot be answered
with any degree of certainty prior to trial, a plaintiff may
spend a considerable amount of money, and an attorney may
spend a considerable amount of time and effort, only to dis-
cover at the verdict stage that the claim was without merit.
Prior to Molien, a defendant was able to move for demurrer
and the judge was able to apply relatively stable standards in
granting or denying the motion. Now such a decision by the
judge is deemed to be an "usurpation of the jury's
function."' 130
Regardless of the abolishment of the physical injury re-
quirement, it is quite obvious that a plaintiff will need to
demonstrate physical manifestations of emotional distress to
justify compensation. Future cases may indicate that these
physical manifestations are akin to the previously required
physical injuries. The results may also indicate that the physi-
cal injuries that provided a plaintiff's verdict in the past are
no longer sufficient to meet the severity requirement of
Molien. Therefore, Molien may not be as broad a step as
many commentators believe, but the impact will be known
medical proof of emotional distress, adopted the Dillon foreseeability factors as a
required standard for recovery. 55 Hawaii at 173, 472 P.2d at 520. One year later in
Kelly v. Kokua Sales & Supply Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975) the court
held that the plaintiff must be "located within a reasonable distance from the scene
of the accident in order to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress." Id.
at 209, 532 P.2d at 676. Within six years the court transgressed from the most exten-
sive recovery allowed for emotional distress to what is now little more than the "zone
of danger" rule which California rejected in Dillon. See text accompanying note 39,
supra. For an excellent analysis of Rodrigues and the Hawaii Supreme Court's strug-
gle with emotional distress claim standards, see Miller, The Scope of Liability for
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit the
Crime," 1 HAwAii L. REv. 1, 9-16 (1979).
130. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839. See note 78,
supra, and accompanying text.
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only after the adjudication of future claims for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress.
Nancy A. Chillag
